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The ‘Art’ of Colonisation: Capitalising
Sovereign Power and the Ongoing
Nature of Primitive Accumulation
TIM DI MUZIO
In order to dispel Adam Smith’s liberal narrative of original accumulation, Karl
Marx offered his own historical account of the rise of capitalism in England. He
also pointed to the English colonies, where the conditions for capitalist develop-
ment were being created by government intervention in his own era.1 Playing
on the discussion of the ‘art of colonisation’ in Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s com-
parative study of England and America, Marx argued that Wakefield’s candid
advice on colonial policy and prosperity revealed the shaky foundations upon
which Adam Smith’s concept of original accumulation was built. According to
Marx, the value of Wakefield’s work rested in his recognition that the social prop-
erty relations of capital did not evolve naturally and spontaneously as liberal
speculative history might imply, but had to be enforced by state power. In this
case, ‘wasteland’ in America had to be sufficiently priced so as to render it difficult
for most immigrants to obtain land.2 Without access to affordable land, newco-
mers to America would have little choice outside starvation but to work for
someone else upon arrival. In this way, state policy featured as a prominent
lever of primitive accumulation insofar as it blocked people from gaining the
means by which they could work for themselves and their families. Thus, even
a cursory consideration of state policy in the colonies made a mockery of
Adam’s Smith’s claim that capital was ‘silently and gradually accumulated by
the private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual
and uninterrupted effort to better their own condition’.3
One would not be too hard pressed to find the liberal intelligentsia pontificating
on ‘the art of colonisation’ today, though with the important caveat that the per-
manent territorial administration of a country is not needed to effect a transform-
ation in social property relations. However, while direct colonisation or
annexation of a political community is seldom argued for, what seems to be
unfolding in our own era is the development of knowledge and practices for a
new art of military intervention premised on the temporary occupation and
technocratic reconstruction-reconstitution of illiberal societies.4 While critical
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theorists largely interpret this development as a return to imperialism under US
authority, militant liberals and others prefer to cast it as a benevolent US-led
state-building project that will eventually provide for a peaceful world order
once ‘failed states’ are reconstituted as liberal-capitalist polities.
While Mark T. Berger has argued for the need to situate resurgent state-building
discourse and practices within a longer historical trajectory, the new sense of
urgency and the development of knowledge/power embedded in state-building pro-
jects appears to be informed by a burgeoning discourse on failed states.5 Indeed, one
of the key phrases in the National Security Strategy of the United States 2002
advised that the USA and its allies are ‘less threatened by conquering states than
. . . failing ones’.6 This may sound like a radically new strategic concern since it
appears to marginalise balance of power theorisations, but it follows on from a
trend studied by Mark Duffield in the late 1990s: the idea that underdevelopment
has become ‘dangerous’ and efforts need to be made to transform such societies
into pacified liberal-capitalist polities.7 However, what many critics of the war on
terror or US imperialism have so far failed to appreciate is how this project
would be impossible without the capitalisation of the state. In this article, I therefore
want to suggest that Marx’s re-theorisation of the concept of primitive accumu-
lation, combined with a non-Marxist theorisation of state power offered by Jonathan
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, can help us account for the intimate connection
between ongoing primitive accumulation and the capitalisation of the US govern-
ment.
While Marx identified a number of mechanisms that led to the social property
relations of capital, one of the most important was the power of the state. Here,
Marx recognised that the creation of the national debt in England was of crucial
importance to the development of capitalist sociality. The national debt not only
offered the propertied classes of England and other nations a secure and profitable
refuge for their money, but it also gave Parliament the required finance it needed to
facilitate and defend the accumulation of capital for the propertied class. At the
same time, the creation of the public debt gradually shifted the burden of repay-
ment onto the whole of English society – not to mention the colonies –
through a more extensive system of taxation and the creation of new ‘national’
debts abroad. One of the major ways the facilitation and defence of accumulation
was accomplished was through wars of conquest and subsequent transformations
in the social property relations of the periphery.8
In a similar way, the temporary occupation and market-making reforms
attempted in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti also rely on the national debt and the con-
fidence of domestic and foreign investors. The major difference in the contempor-
ary period is that it is primarily on the basis of the public debt of the USA that the
advancement of primitive accumulation by force continues. However, while it
may be argued that these new interventions hinge on US sovereign debt, Marx
never explicitly developed a theory of the capitalisation of the state. Somewhat
ironically, this theorisation has instead been developed by two political econom-
ists working outside the Marxist tradition. Rejecting both the neoclassical utility
theory of value as well as Marx’s labour theory of value, Nitzan and Bichler
offer a power theory of value that approaches capitalism from the viewpoint of
capitalisation.9 From this standpoint, there are at least two crucial questions that
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must be asked: (1) what is being capitalised?; and (2) for what purposes is this
entity being financed? Rich empirical work on what Nitzan and Bichler call ‘domi-
nant capital’ lead them to argue that (1) capital can be theorised as a form of com-
modified power, (2) this power is primarily aimed at shaping and reshaping the
terrain of social reproduction, and (3) its accumulation must be measured differ-
entially rather than absolutely.10 Because the state can be conceived of as a capi-
talised entity measured by the pecuniary value of its public debt, Nitzan and
Bichler have argued that investors capitalise the state’s power to tax and shape
the landscape of social reproduction when they purchase government securities.
To explore the ways in which the concept of primitive accumulation and Nitzan
and Bichler’s theorisation of the state can contribute to theorising the connection
between the new interventions and the ongoing capitalisation of the US govern-
ment, I have divided the article in the following way. First, I address one of the
current debates on whether the concept of primitive accumulation remains
useful for understanding key components of globalisation, political economy
and the constitution and reconstitution of world order. My argument here is that
the concept remains useful for understanding historical transitions not only to
capitalist social property relations but also a more marketised and commodified
world order.11 This is so for two main reasons. First, capitalist social property
relations have not spread uniformly and they cannot be said to pervade all
human societies in an equal manner. Second, it is possible to conceive of resist-
ance as a constitutive moment of primitive accumulation since peoples have
struggled – often successfully – to erect social barriers to the full mediation of
their lives by the imperatives of the capitalist market.12 To evaluate the usefulness
of primitive accumulation as a concept, I engage primarily with the work of Nitzan
and Bichler and their novel theory of capital and accumulation. I do so not only
because they offer one of the most convincing non-Marxist theories of capitalism,
but also because those concerned with capitalist globalisation have so far refused
to consider their important arguments. Here I try to show that we can accept their
novel theory of capital as a capitalised and commodified form of power, but argue
that the concept of primitive accumulation still has considerable analytical value
for theorising the extension and depth of capitalist social property relations within
and across political jurisdictions.
After having established the relevance of the concept of primitive accumu-
lation, I consider the role of the politico-military apparatus of the USA in advan-
cing primitive accumulation by pointing to the series: sovereignty–primitive
accumulation–social reproduction. The main argument advanced here is that it
is possible to conceive of the politico-military apparatus of the USA as a capita-
lised agency whose strategic goal is not simply to secure a more encompassing
form of economic globalisation, but to introduce and intensify what Marx called
‘the silent compulsion of the market’ across political jurisdictions sheltered
from the complete instantiation of market imperatives. This is not to suggest
that agencies within the USA are the sole force seeking to strengthen the dictates
of the market by transforming illiberal political economies into liberal capitalist
states.13 However, because the politico-military apparatus of the USA does play
a unique role in shaping world order, most of my focus will be on theorising
why the sovereign power of the USA is capitalised by investors.14 Here, I consider
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the joint work of Wall Street and Pentagon strategists since their observations go a
long way in demonstrating how investors think about financing the US state and
how this finance is understood as vital to projects that seek to shape the global
terrain of social reproduction and the future of world order. In the final section,
I offer evidence from Iraq to support the claim that the concept of primitive
accumulation combined with a new theorisation of state power can help us
understand current attempts to reconstitute the political economies of occupied
societies.
Theorising primitive accumulation and the international
There has been something of a revival of the concept of primitive accumulation
across academic disciplines. One of the main debates considers whether mechan-
isms of primitive accumulation are ongoing or whether the concept should be con-
fined to describing the initial transition to the social property relations of capital.15
If the latter proves to be the case, then we would do well simply to focus on the
mechanisms and logic of contemporary accumulation and cease any discussion
of primitive accumulation – save perhaps for those historical studies concerned
with how the transition to capitalist social relations takes place in different parts
of the world. In this section, then, I want to address this debate on primitive
accumulation and argue that it continues to be a useful concept for theorising
the constitution and reconstitution of world order.
Whereas Adam Smith tried to account for an original accumulation of stock by
imagining two races of people – one industrious and frugal, the other lazy and
prone to immediate consumption – Marx rearticulated Smith’s entire problematic
by searching for historical accounts and evidence of this period of so-called
‘original accumulation’. What Marx was most concerned to show was that
capitalist economic development did not stem from a mythical period of original
accumulation carried on peacefully or from an extensive division of labour.
Instead, Marx focused on how a specific transformation in social property relations
led to a new mode of exploitation and wealth generation for a capitalist propertied
class. For Marx, the social property relations of capital were born of force and
fraud and were first realised in England. Here, Marx recognised the importance
of the politico-juridical apparatus in carrying out and securing the expropriation
of direct producers. In this sense, primitive accumulation was essentially the
process of waging a war of internal (and later external) colonisation whereby a pri-
vileged class of landlords and merchants came to constitute a new form of private
property, primarily by expropriating direct and/or independent producers. Once
this new form or property was de facto constituted, the owning class sought to
secure their claims to ownership with a new juridical armature that subordinated
royal sovereignty to property.16
By expropriating the peasantry through successive techniques, property owners
created the conditions in which it was virtually impossible for increasing numbers
of people to survive outside market relationships. What this means is that human
survival, perhaps for the first time in history, was made contingent upon certain
market imperatives.17 For Marx, this represented a new mode of exploitation,
because without direct access to land and the means of livelihood, more and
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more people were compelled to sell their capacity to labour to someone else in
return for a wage. In other words, non-property owners were made socially
dependent on property owners for their life-activity. This represented a new
social relation of power for Marx not simply because people had been stripped
of their ability to work directly for themselves and their families, but also, and
more importantly, because Marx supposed that workers added more value to the
products they created during the labour process than what they were actually
paid by their capitalist employers.
The question addressed in one of the current debates on primitive accumulation
is whether this interpretation of primitive accumulation can help explain current
events or whether it should simply denote an initial transition to capitalism.
Those who argue within the historical primitive accumulation vein contend that
once the revolution in social property relations is legally and politically guaran-
teed by capitalist owners and their supporters, the process is complete and
the real forces or laws of accumulation can take over. What this entails is that
the mechanisms of primitive accumulation have a historical point of cessation
since the continuance of human exploitation for profit can be carried out under
market disciplines that disguise not only the origins of capitalist profit, but also
the relations of dominance and power that made this mode of exploitation possible
in the first place. For instance, Paul Zarembka argues that since the separation of
the worker from the means of production characterises both primitive accumu-
lation and accumulation proper, the prefix ‘primitive’ is applied by Marx simply
in order to describe the historical transition from feudalism to capitalism.18
Outside Marxist quarters, the debate becomes even more complicated when we
consider one of the most recent and novel theories of capital and accumulation.
Informed by Thorstein Veblen’s political economy and originating from a critique
of neoclassical as well as orthodox Marxist theories of capital and accumulation,
Nitzan and Bichler argue that capital is primarily a ‘strategic, power institution’
whose capacity to generate earnings and beat an average rate of profit is capita-
lised by owners/investors.19 In this theorisation, the politics of production
(rather than production per se) and the power of dominant corporations to shape
the terrain of social production and reproduction in order to accumulate take
centre stage.20 What this means is that power itself is a vendible commodity.
This is so for at least two reasons.
First, the ability to generate earnings over time implies that the full productive
capacity or efficiency of humanity must be strategically sabotaged as a going
concern of any business enterprise. In this sense, the business enterprise is not
committed to maximising production or even increasing productivity as an end
in itself, but rather to controlling production and productivity for profitable
ends. This sabotage is strategically necessary because too much productive
capacity can threaten earnings. Thus the source of accumulation in Nitzan and
Bichler’s formulation is not productivity as such, nor is it the exploitation of
workers who produce over and above what they are compensated in money. For
them, profit is a direct result of a firm’s control over the productive potential of
humanity and its capacity to influence the course of human development and
reproduction. However, since all firms must sabotage in order to accumulate,
Nitzan and Bichler believe that there is an average rate of sabotage whose
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typical expression can be found in the normal rate of return for any given index or
benchmark of accumulation – for example, the Nikkei 225 or the S&P 500.21 The
goal of corporate executives or money managers is to beat the average rate of
return. This brings us to the second reason why the politics of production and
the power of business firms takes centre stage in this new theory of capital.
For Nitzan and Bichler, the earnings of dominant capital groups depend upon
broader social, cultural and political processes and less on the ability of individual
firms to control production within their own corporate organisations. In order to
beat the average rate of profit, corporations must attempt to redistribute a larger
share of earnings away from their competitors in the corporate universe. What
this means is that corporate executives must do all they can to shape the social, cul-
tural and political terrain in their favour. For example, the corporate earnings of
Apple Computer Inc. do not simply depend upon the ability to produce its range
of iPods or other goods and services by directing the labour of its workers.
Rather, their corporate earnings, and the willingness of investors to bid up the
price of existing shares, depend upon a whole range of factors that the corporation
may wish to influence: the perception that portable mp3 players are a necessity;
their ability to press for new markets and trade agreements with other legal juris-
dictions; the ability of the state to punish violators who infringe their intellectual
property rights; the quality of their lobbyists; their public reputation; accounting
practices and standards; the ability of its consumers to access credit; the ability
to influence anti-trust legislation and so on. What is of note is that the economic
performance or earning capacity of firms is not based simply on the goods and ser-
vices they offer for sale, but on a range of factors whose potential impact on a com-
pany’s net income is taken into account or discounted by investors.
This understanding of accumulation leads Nitzan and Bichler to argue that
‘power is both the means and the end of accumulation’.22 Put simply, this
means that corporations exert whatever power they have over society and politics
in order to generate earnings and beat the average rate of profit. If they are success-
ful in their quest, the price of their ownership claims (stocks and corporate bonds)
will increase, as well as their overall market capitalisation. The monetary magni-
tude of a firm’s capitalisation indicates not only its ‘power to restructure society
and affect its overall development’23 relative to other firms, but the perception
of owners and investors that the firm will be able to do so in the future. For
example, Exxon was the eighth largest capitalised business enterprise in April
1999 with a market value of US$181 billion. In December 1999, the total value
of its outstanding shares jumped to US$282 billion thanks largely to its acquisition
of Mobil. By January 2006, Exxon Mobil became the largest capitalised firm in the
world with a market value of US$381 billion, largely because of its record profits
generated by instability in the Middle East and devastating hurricanes in the USA.
In just over five years, then, Exxon Mobil’s capitalisation more than doubled.24
If Nitzan and Bichler are correct, behind this movement is a whole history of
corporate power deployed to ‘restructure society and affect its overall develop-
ment’.25 Indeed, even a cursory glance at Exxon’s dealings since the late 1990s
reveals some startling initiatives. Some of Exxon Mobil’s actions during this
period include: lobbying the European Commission, the US Federal Trade Com-
mission and politicians on Capitol Hill in order to get its merger with Mobil
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approved in 1999; lobbying the US State Department to lift sanctions on Libya to
exploit its oil wealth; volunteering to train Iraqi oil workers; influencing public
perceptions by funding institutions who deny global warming and advising the
George W. Bush administration to abandon the Kyoto global warming treaty;
hiring and supplying local military personnel in Aceh in order to protect its
natural gas fields; garnering public funding from the World Bank in order to
help finance its operations in Chad and Cameroon; potentially conspiring with
British Petroleum to restrict the supply of natural gas from Alaska; appealing
the US$4.5 billion dollar settlement awarded in a class-action suit to victims of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill; influencing US Vice-President Cheney’s Energy
Task Force; and lobbying to drill in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
The list could go on.26 The point is that all of these factors – which involve
the politics and power of production rather than production per se – enter
into the potential profitability of Exxon Mobil and the decision of investors to
capitalise the firm.
If we take this convincing new theory of capital as our starting point, then con-
tinuing to talk about primitive accumulation seems largely redundant. This is
because Nitzan and Bichler’s understanding of capital and accumulation begins
from the point of view of capitalisation. In other words they ask: what is being
capitalised and why? If investors/owners are indeed capitalising commodified
forms of power when they purchase ownership claims to business entities, and cor-
porations exert power over politics and society in order to generate earnings and
beat a given average rate of return, then all of the strategic attempts of firms to
‘accumulate by dispossession’, enclose or commodify human life and resources
are nothing more than moments in the process of accumulation.27 Put simply, in
their view there is nothing ‘primitive’ about accumulation.28
However, one of the difficulties of Nitzan and Bichler’s theory lies in accepting
it without a history. It is a persuasive and compelling narrative based on convin-
cing empirical evidence, but one that would be more forceful with a history
beyond their transhistorical claim that the rulers of civilisations have always
sought ‘to control nature and people’.29 This is not to say that Nitzan and
Bichler fail to recognise the historical specificity of capitalism as a new form of
power and control with a universalising trajectory based on the commodification
and accumulation of power. Indeed, at the very heart of their theory is the notion
that capital is distinguished from all previous forms of ruling civilisations due to
its relatively systematic quantification and commodification of power, but the
problem lies in explaining its historical development. For example, as far back
as the thirteenth century, Venetian bankers traded in government securities in
line with Nitzan and Bichler’s account of capital as a process whereby power is
commodified and quantified. We may do well to find the origins of capital and
its development in the Italian city-states. The problem here is that while there
were incipient forms of capitalisation in public securities and thus one could
contend from the point of view of their theory a commodification of power,
there was no ability to extend the systematic quantification of power along a uni-
versalising trajectory. What was needed was not simply the commodification and
quantification of powerful institutions capable of shaping a part of the social
process, but the commodification of a particular kind of power whose purchaser
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does not have absolute ownership over the thing. That power is the capacity to
labour for a set period of time in return for a wage and this required a particular
kind of societal transformation that the so-called political Marxists or historical
materialists have traced specifically to England.30
As these scholars have been at pains to emphasise, the possibility of capitalist
development was historically realised in the English countryside where very
specific pre-capitalist social property relations prevailed – relations that even-
tually encouraged and even permitted the systematic commodification of labour
power by historically new economic imperatives. I will not rehearse the intricacies
of the transition debate here, but the point of crucial importance is that it is in the
English countryside where we find the first mass waves of landlords expropriating
the rights of the peasantry through changes in land tenure. Through force, fraud,
economic necessity and a developing market in land and competitive rents,
more and more peasant producers were separated from their immediate access
to the means of survival. However, this transition did not immediately translate
into a class of wage-labourers easily exploitable by capital.
Indeed, according to Karl Polanyi, it was only in 1832 with the repeal of the
poor laws that a truly ‘free’ market in labour became a reality. Without this com-
modification of labour and the commodification of money and land that preceded
it, the accumulation of money on a potentially endless scale would have been
impossible. Thus, even if we were to accept Nitzan and Bichler’s account of
capital and its accumulation in our own era, we must admit that it rests on an
initial transformation in social property relations and that this process has not
been sufficiently addressed by their theoretical framework. Because primitive
accumulation has an international dimension insofar as more and more political
communities have undergone this transition in social property relations through
moments of combined and uneven development (China, Vietnam and the
former Eastern European Bloc are perhaps the most recent examples), the
concept of ‘primitive accumulation’ is of particular importance for those who
want to account for the historical constitution of capitalist sociality.31
Yet this argument has only solved why the concept of ‘primitive accumulation’
may be of continuing importance for scholars of international relations who are
concerned with accounting for the transition to a more universalised form of capi-
talist sociality. This brings us to the important question of whether the concept is
still useful for explaining key components of contemporary international relations,
political economy and the creation of a world order for corporate capital.
The problem with interpretations that want to relegate primitive accumulation
to the past is that by doing so they tacitly agree to the notion that the social
relations of capital pervade everywhere on the planet. In other words, these theor-
isations tend to assume the complete ‘death of the peasantry’ or other social for-
mations, and therefore a full-blown capitalist sociality in which all human beings
are subject to the same market imperatives for their survival – a claim that has
been significantly undermined.32 The second difficulty with relegating primitive
accumulation to the past is that it denies or at least underplays the possibility of
resistance to capitalist initiatives and market imperatives. In other words, it not
only ignores the presence of social forces which actively and consciously
oppose their own subjugation to market imperatives, but also denies that these
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same forces can be successful in their attempts to mitigate, curtail or even liberate
themselves from market compulsions and the power of capital. In this regard, it is
worthwhile to consider the work of Massimo De Angelis, perhaps the first critical
scholar to offer a dialectical theory of the ongoing nature of primitive accumu-
lation in the face of resistance.
(Primitive) accumulation and resistance
Much like Nitzan and Bichler, De Angelis understands ‘capital not as a totalised
system, but as a force with totalizing drives’.33 What this means is that anything
can potentially become a facet of capital through enclosure, expropriation and
commodification, and indeed Nitzan and Bichler might tell us that all capitalist
activity revolves around ownership and thus exclusion and enclosure. But the
chief difference between their theorisation and the one offered by De Angelis
involves the question of resistance. For De Angelis, it is not only important to con-
sider the ways in which capitalist power is exerted over society, but also the ways in
which the collective forces of society can erect social barriers to the accumulation
of capital. These social barriers can perhaps be conceived along a continuum where
one extreme represents life’s total mediation by the market and the other extreme
represents life’s total independence from market exchanges. For example, any
political community with a public health care system that is universally accessible
by virtue of citizenship has erected a social barrier to life’s full mediation by the
market mechanism in access to health services. In this case, the public has excluded
a field of potential accumulation from capitalist ownership. Of course, firms inter-
ested in profiting from the illnesses and injuries of human society may seek to dis-
mantle and/or open up this field to business imperatives, but the fact remains that
people have struggled and continue to struggle to erect social barriers to life’s full
mediation by the market in many fields. This is reminiscent of Polanyi’s idea that
the social dislocations caused by market imperatives generate various forms of
struggle, albeit not always with progressive outcomes.
It would be unfair, however, to say that Nitzan and Bichler do not have a reg-
ister for struggle in their theorisation of capital as power. While their main concern
is not resistance to capitalist imperatives from below, they do account for resist-
ance from the perspective of business firms in two main ways: active and
passive.34 First, because the accumulation of differential power, as measured in
monetary magnitudes, requires deliberate and active intervention on behalf of
business firms, the process of accumulation necessarily entails struggles and
counter-struggles between firms, as well as between firms and the rest of
society. The second way Nitzan and Bichler register resistance is through their
concept of passive differential accumulation. Investors can simply wait for the
price of their securities to go up over time or corporate investors can discount
moments of resistance into their asset prices. Resistance, therefore, can become
a facet of capital accumulation when investors bid down the price of corporate
shares due to struggles or potential struggles that look to threaten the expected
profitability of the firm. To illustrate what appears to be a subtle difference
between De Angelis’ understanding of resistance and Nitzan and Bichler’s, we
can take the case of water privatisation in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
The ‘Art’ of Colonisation
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From De Angelis’ perspective, the public supply and availability of water at
reasonable prices, not to mention the direct access Bolivians had to water wells,
would already represent a social barrier to capital arrived at through historical
struggle. Because these forms of access represent a barrier to accumulation, par-
ticularly for those companies whose profits stem from water-related activities,
these firms may seek to breakdown these forms of access in their quest for
greater net income. Given that the distribution and sanitation of water was even-
tually privatised in Bolivia, De Angelis might point to the agreement signed by the
Bolivian government with the World Bank as a moment of primitive accumu-
lation. This moment represents both the breakdown of a social barrier to private
ownership and the process by which a public resource is commodified for
profit. As such, it created a new form of market dependence for Bolivian citizens
and the possibility for resistance from below. This is not simply because water is
essential for life, but because the corporate control of water gives the firm the
power to deny water access to those who cannot pay. As water costs increased dra-
matically under corporate control, coordinated resistance soon followed, leading
to the re-socialisation of Cochabamba’s water system.35 What this points to is
the possibility of theorising resistance from below as a constitutive moment in
the process of primitive accumulation.
From the perspective of capital as power, this struggle is indicative of active
differential accumulation insofar as Bechtel (through its subsidiary Aguas del
Tunari) deliberately sought control over Cochabamba’s water system as part of
its corporate strategy. It may also represent passive differential accumulation
insofar as their theory would anticipate that smart corporate investors could
have discounted this resistance movement into their asset prices.
Yet, while this may be an accurate account from the viewpoint of corporate
owners, it does little to focus our attention on how and why people continue to
struggle against the full instantiation of market imperatives. It also tends to over-
look an entire history of resistance and the possibility for resistance in the future.
But the concept of primitive accumulation seems to be important precisely
because it focuses our attention on the very processes by which people are increas-
ingly separated from non-market access to the means of life and the various ways
they come to resist capitalist imperatives by setting up social barriers to the further
commodification of life and nature. In this sense, the concept acts like a flashlight,
illuminating moments of dispossession and resistance. It tells us not simply that
power is being exerted over us, but that there is a struggle running through the
entire history of capital and its attempt to control human and natural life
through commodification and enclosure. One way to understand this struggle in
our own conjuncture of the new occupations is to connect the concept of primitive
accumulation with Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of the capitalisation of the state.
Capitalising sovereign power
Scholars have so far failed to appreciate the ways in which the politico-military
apparatus of the USA has been capitalised and how this is intimately connected
with primitive accumulation and the international or global expansion of market
imperatives and resistance. What seems to be peculiar about the political
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economy of the USA is its continued ability to attract a seemingly endless stream
of capitalisation for its income-generating assets when previous hegemonic states
witnessed a massive haemorrhaging of capital. This too may be subject to change
and some have even predicted that US economic hegemony is in decline and
will eventually shift to Asia.36 There are of course a number of possible explanations
for this magnetic effect, ranging from the expected future profitability of firms listed
on US stock exchanges to comparatively low levels of risk for corporate bonds and
government securities. But while providing explanations for this ongoing
capitalisation of America’s political economy as a whole is certainly worthwhile,
it might be more important to seek answers for the continued capitalisation of the
sovereign power of the USA, registered by claims on the federal government and,
by extension, the US public.
This is important for at least two reasons. First, the US Treasury market is the
largest financial market in the world and, if we can consider, as Nitzan and Bichler
do, the state as a capitalisable entity measured in the amount of debt owed to its
creditors, the US federal government is the world’s largest capitalised entity.37
This obviously begs the question of what investors are buying when they purchase
US sovereign debt obligations. The answer is far from self-evident, but a first
approximation might suggest that investors are purchasing claims on the govern-
ment’s ability to raise enough revenue to pay back its creditors with interest. The
second reason for focusing on the sovereign power of the USA is that its massive
spending on the means of force and coercion far exceeds that of other countries.
Indeed, of all world military expenditures, the USA accounted for 47 per cent
in 2004. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, US
military spending in 2004 was ‘more than the combined total of the 32 next
most powerful nations’.38 Whether we consider this ‘defence’ spending or not,
what is eminently clear is that the security apparatus of the USA has extended
far beyond its national borders by way of military bases and the capacity to
deploy its forces anywhere in the world – a trend facilitated by the increasing pri-
vatisation of national security and the militarisation of space.39
The fact that the US federal government is the largest capitalised entity in the
world and also happens to be the world’s largest military spender should lead us to
seek answers for the continued capitalisation of the sovereign power of the USA,
especially when it has become increasingly popular to predict the USA’s financial
demise and its inability to shape the future constitution of world order.40 Part of
the answer involves investigating the sovereignty–primitive accumulation–
social reproduction series. Tracing this series, my main argument runs as follows:
1. Sovereignty. The sovereign power of the USA, embedded in the strength of its
politico-military apparatus and the ability of its political class to define the
‘national interest’, is capitalised by investors and registered or measured by
the outstanding public debt to its creditors. The USA invests a large portion
of this finance in its future ability to project power globally and intervene
and wage war relative to other countries. In this sense, statements on how
the USA will deploy its sovereign power, such as the National Security
Strategy 2002 or US Space Command’s Vision 2020, can be considered a
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kind of investment prospectus; they give creditors considerable indication of
how the USA will mobilise its military power in the future.
2. Primitive accumulation. Intervention and war can be considered a mechanism
of primitive accumulation insofar as the stated purpose of the US government is
the reconstitution of political economies as open market economies capable of
providing a more global field of operation for business firms and access to stra-
tegic assets. This entails breaking down ‘social barriers’ or mechanisms that
grant some degree of non-market access to the means of life.
3. Social reproduction. The creation of market economies leads to a particular
pattern of social reproduction whereby more of human life on the planet is
mediated by the imperatives of the market and the capitalist firms that dominate
them. However, in reproducing their social life, human beings often find ways
to resist the full instantiation of market imperatives. Thus the attempt to radi-
cally transform the social property relations of a country, particularly by mili-
tary force, is always a contested project.
If this is an accurate assessment of how the capitalisation of US sovereign power,
primitive accumulation and the social reproduction of human life are connected,
how might we be able to explain this historically as well as theoretically?
Sovereign power and the creation of ‘public’ debt
A first cut at the problem might consider and build on Marx’s initial writings on
the state and primitive accumulation. In his historical sketch on the origins of capi-
talist development, Marx recognised that the transformation to capitalist social
property relations – both in England and in the colonies – would have been
impossible without the power of the state or what he called the ‘concentrated
and organised force of society’.41 With the incorporation of the Bank of
England in 1694 and the subsequent creation of the national and long-term
debt, Marx argued that the English state had been effectively alienated by
sale.42 What Marx meant by this was that the state was largely in the hands of
the people who financed its operations – a fact made possible by the English
Civil War and the violent suppression of alternative political projects.
Before the war, the Crown in England had to finance its operations by the
income it derived from its royal estates and a limited system of taxation. When
monarchs could not finance their initiatives from these two sources of revenue,
they contracted private debt. In other words, when monarchs borrowed, it was
not the public’s debt, but their own personal obligation.43 Yet, since monarchs
could not be tried in any of the nation’s courts, they had the power to force
private citizens to lend them money on favourable terms, and could even repudiate
their debts. When this proved more difficult for successive monarchs due to heavy
resistance from money lenders, shifts in the balance of power between the monar-
chy and its subjects, and ongoing and impending wars, the monarch would either
sell off portions of the royal estates to private citizens or seek to increase or extend
the level of taxation on the population.44 The English Civil War, the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and the subsequent creation of the Bank of England altered
this financial arrangement.
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In combination, these events had serious consequences for the future of
England’s political economy – and we might add, the world’s. First, they
changed the very nature of sovereign authority by democratising it for the proper-
tied class. This could only be accomplished by eliminating the monarchy’s exclu-
sive power to raise its own funds and spend them at its discretion. The newly
victorious parliamentarians ensured that this would be the case, first by abolishing
the royal prerogative to tax, and second by granting the monarch a set amount of
funds that would be closely audited.45 With sovereign power redefined, the
moneyed and propertied classes could effectively lend to themselves and
control fiscal policy to ensure timely payments of interest on the debt and the prin-
cipal when debt obligations came due. However, this was not interpreted as the
debt of a class lending to itself in order to further its own advancement and enrich-
ment. Rather, the debt was interpreted as a ‘national’ or ‘public’ debt collectively
owed by the people of the realm:
The public concept, when applied to the capital market, rests on
the notion of national issue and guarantee of state debt. State
finance became public finance when a governing body representing
the people of a nation, not the king alone, borrowed funds for the
state. In its capacity as public representative, the governing body
contracted loans. The legislature was legally liable to provide
adequate tax revenue to pay interest on the public debt, and to
redeem principal when it came due.46
The concept of the national as opposed to the royal debt transformed the political
economy of the English state once investors could be convinced that the govern-
ment had sufficient power to ensure an adequate collection of revenues through
taxation. Subsequent to this new financial innovation, the taxation, administrative
and war-making apparatuses of the English state ballooned.47 While we do not
need to dwell on the various mechanisms used to extract money from the
people in order to repay rich creditors, the important point to note here is that,
without the ‘national’ debt, private finance would not have been as forthcoming
and the geographical scope and intensity of primitive accumulation, as well as
capitalist development, would have been far more limited. Marx realised this con-
nection when he noted how colonial wars and the capacity to wage them, the
national debt, the system of taxation and the system of tariff protection arrived
on the historical scene together.48 While Marx recognised the important role
played by public credit and the taxation system as an expropriating agent, he
did not develop a theory of the capitalisation of the state, nor did he conceive
of power as a vendible commodity in his theory of accumulation.
Whereas Marx did not develop such a theory and the Marxist tradition has
almost completely neglected the alienation of the state by sale and the wider impli-
cations of theorising its power as a commodity, Nitzan and Bichler have sought to
offer a more comprehensive explanation.49 In fact, the idea that the state is capi-
talised and that its power and operations are essentially commodified can be attrib-
uted entirely to Nitzan and Bichler’s original theorisation of capital as a form of
power that shapes and reshapes the social process. As they note:
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The modern nation state, from its very beginning, was highly
dependent on capitalist finance, whilst capitalisation was similarly
reliant on state power. Indeed, it was this fusion between them
which gave rise to the first form of modern capital – the govern-
ment bond – whose very essence was the private ownership of
the government’s power to tax. Since then, the overlap grew
deeper and wider, with an increasing proportion of capital values
depending on, and in turn dictating the nature of key political insti-
tutions and organizations.50
While the capitalisation of the state was not the first form of capitalisation, it was
undoubtedly the most important and far-reaching because of the state’s monopoly
over the means of force and its ability to use this force in order to collect taxes,
open up new territories for exploitation and create the politico-juridical apparatus
needed to protect and often extend the rights of private ownership. Moreover, as
Nitzan and Bichler point out in the quote above, as small business concerns devel-
oped into capitalised entities themselves, their net earnings increasingly depended
upon and influenced the shape of ‘key political institutions and organizations’. For
example, mortgaging the public revenues to private creditors not only changed the
nature of the Exchequer and the information it collected during the financial revo-
lution in England, but it also led to the very creation of joint-stock companies, a
more extensive system of taxation and the development of a professionalised
and increasingly well-equipped military.51
For Nitzan and Bichler, however, the commodification of the state does not
simply mean that its powers to tax have been effectively privatised. They also
point to the fact that investors increasingly discount state policies since they
invariably impact upon corporate profits. What this means is that investors are
increasingly anticipating the actions of government actors and assess their
impacts on future profitability and adjust their expectations accordingly – a
process made more predictable by panoptic strategies and lobbying efforts.52
For example, suppose that energy and automotive firms lobbied the US govern-
ment in an attempt to encourage it not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Investors
could anticipate the success or failure of this endeavour based on comments and
affirmations made by politicians and therefore take this into consideration when
deciding whether to invest, discount or ultimately divest from an automotive
or energy corporation. When this occurs, and Nitzan and Bichler believe that
it increasingly does, then government decision making itself becomes a facet
of capital.
Yet there is more to the story. Nitzan and Bichler conceive of the modern cor-
poration itself as an incipient form of state, insofar as firms come to control ever
more facets of life and planetary resources. To some this might seem like a wild
stretch of the imagination, but a brief example may serve to highlight the parallels
between the modern corporation and the state. If it is true that government bonds
ultimately represent the privatisation of the government’s power to tax, then it is
not impossible to conceive of the corporation as an embryonic form of state. For
example, the modern food system is largely controlled by giant food service cor-
porations and global agribusiness.53 Because many people on the planet do not
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produce their own food for consumption, we rely primarily on these corporations
in order to eat and live. When investors capitalise these firms, they are essentially
investing in the privatisation of food production and the power of these firms to
attract customers to their individual products or services. The parallel with govern-
mental apparatuses and the food corporation is that they are both commodified
forms of power, albeit in different fields: one capitalises the power to tax
(among other powers), the other the power to make profit by supplying, or some-
times not supplying, food.54 As more and more people depend on market
exchanges to mediate their existence, and as the market becomes increasingly
dominated by giant corporations – some with revenues larger than the gross dom-
estic product of most countries – it is not inconceivable to think of corporations as
an incipient form of state given their ‘social centrality’ to everyday life.55
While I agree with Nitzan and Bichler that the commodification of the state ulti-
mately represents the privatisation of the government’s power to tax, what their
theorisation largely ignores is how the financing of the US government and, by
implication, its politico-military apparatus is intimately connected with global
moments of primitive accumulation that set the stage for a more market-oriented
process of social reproduction. Indeed, in their accounts of the new wars Nitzan
and Bichler do not seem excessively concerned with transformations on the
ground and the resistance this process has generated. However, before examining
the intimate connection between the capitalisation of sovereign power, primitive
accumulation and social reproduction in relation to the new art of colonisation
in Iraq, I want to demonstrate how the capitalisation of the US military and its
role in shaping the terrain of social reproduction along more market lines is under-
stood in the minds of many ‘security policymakers, Wall Street heavyweights, and
academic experts’.56
Capitalising ‘futures worth creating’
It’s for real. The for-profit nation-state, with a globally dispersed
citizenry of shareholders, is the next stage in the evolution of pol-
itical economy.57
Critical as well as orthodox scholars have noticed the work of Thomas P. Barnett
as an important testament of US Grand Strategy and its stated commitment to
economic globalisation.58 However, few have understood his work from the
vantage point of capitalisation. Following up on his article in Esquire, Barnett
published a book in 2004 entitled The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in
the Twenty-First Century. In the text, Barnett is concerned to demonstrate how
he is the cartographer of the Pentagon’s new map for military intervention into
the foreseeable future. He conceives of the USA as a global Leviathan whose
sovereign bonds are capitalised by foreign and domestic investors because the
USA offers investors a ‘future worth creating’ by providing ‘the world a security
product that is unrivaled’.59 In other words, Barnett conceptualises the politico-
military apparatus of the USA and its capacity to shape the future contours of
world order as a commodity purchased by investors. From this it follows that
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investors will continue to finance US debt as long as its politico-military apparatus
appears capable of exerting a controlling influence on the future constitution of
world order. This might sound like an unconventional and even crude understand-
ing of the state, but it was not developed by Barnett alone.
Barnett’s new map was facilitated by war game simulations sponsored by the
global financial service provider Cantor Fitzgerald and the Naval War College.
According to the Pentagon’s new cartographer, seeing the world through a bond
firm’s eyes allowed him to pinpoint the locations where the USA would likely
intervene in the future to create market economies. In drawing this new map,
Barnett divides the world into three categories and states fall into these categories
according to their degree of economic openness and their general commitment to
providing a safe and secure environment for business firms. Governments that
have accepted and seek to liberalise markets constitute the Core; governments
that show some commitment to open markets and the security of property consti-
tute the Seam; and governments that have failed to connect their economies to the
global market are labelled the Gap. The strategic goal is to use the politico-military
apparatus of the USA to shrink the Gap states by transforming them into open
market economies with the capacity to secure the rights of capitalist ownership
and perhaps other liberal freedoms. Once the international states system is mostly
constituted by stable and open market economies, Barnett argues that the prospects
for global peace will improve significantly. This is the Pentagon’s ‘future worth
creating’, and Barnett contends that it is sold to investors when they purchase US
government securities. It is a future world order where warfare becomes increas-
ingly rare because the ‘silent compulsions of the market’ are presumed to dictate
life chances and outcomes.
As Barnett suggests, the continued ability of the US politico-military apparatus
to act abroad is indeed contingent upon its ability to finance its operations by
issuing debt. As an indication of just how crucial this is, the George W. Bush
administration has recently had to plead with Congress to ‘increase the statutory
debt limit to nearly $9 trillion . . . to avoid a default and keep the government oper-
ating’.60 A further indication of the USA’s need for finance is the recent return of
the long bond, a 30-year debt instrument that was eliminated by the Clinton
administration based on the projection of real and estimated fiscal surpluses.
With the Bush administration’s foreign and domestic policy agenda in dire need
of finance, the long bond’s return may well be taken as a sign of necessity and,
perhaps, imperial desperation.61
But when Barnett maps out the potential future targets of US military inter-
vention he is doing something more without realising it. He is also mapping
out the countries where the social property relations of capital are not deeply
embedded and where the politico-juridical order of a state has made it difficult
or impossible for transnational firms to seek out new fields of investment and
profit potential. The following section on Iraq provides considerable evidence
to suggest the connections between the ongoing capitalisation of the sovereign
power of the USA and attempts to re-engineer temporarily occupied societies
along market lines.62
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Transformation and resistance in occupied Iraq
This is not liberation, it is occupation. At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, we thought we’d seen the end of colonies,
but now we’re entering a new era of colonisation.
Ghasib Hassan63
(A leader of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions)
There is hardly any debate that the engineers of Iraq’s occupation intended to
transform Iraq’s political economy from one premised upon socialism to one
more fully amenable to market imperatives. Under the Provisional Constitution
of 1970, in force until the occupation, the full realisation of market imperatives
and disciplines was blocked since Iraqi citizens had rights that granted them a con-
siderable degree of non-market access to the means of survival.64 In other words,
the Provisional Constitution acted as a kind of social barrier to the full mediation
of life by capitalist markets, while at the same time precluding Iraq from full mem-
bership into the liberal capitalist international order being constructed by the USA
in the post-war period. For instance, the Constitution guaranteed the right to free
education up to and including the university level, the right to employment and
free medical care for all citizens. The Constitution also interpreted Iraq’s national
resources and the nation’s means of production as the people’s inviolable property
and could only be employed by the state for the benefit of the national economy.
Furthermore, while the constitution did not disallow private property and even
barred the state from confiscating it without due compensation, it defined the own-
ership of private property as a social privilege that could be rescinded if its use was
considered detrimental to the interests of the Iraqi people. The constitution also
sought to limit the size of agricultural land holdings so that titles to surplus land
would be transferred to the state for potential redistribution and settlement.
Although exceptions could be made for some individuals, foreigners were prohib-
ited from owning real estate by the provisional constitution.
While not all of these freedoms and rights were guaranteed in practice, after
1970 Iraq became the most economically and socially developed state in the
Arab world. Among the achievements were rising standards of living for urban
populations, one of the best health care and educational systems in the Middle
East, an increased literacy rate, increased agricultural productivity, public
service provisioning to the more destitute south and growing per capita income.
A protracted and devastating war with Iran, the build-up of foreign debt as a
result, as well as the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent United Nations sanc-
tions regime, altered the course of Iraq’s quasi-independent nationalist develop-
ment along more socialist lines. However, while there were some initial
attempts in the late 1980s to liberalise Iraq’s political economy and curtail
labour resistance (for instance, the government banned unions), the more complete
transformation of its social property regime followed on the heels of the occu-
pation and many of the Orders established by the US-run Coalition Provisional
Authority. For instance, Order 12 liberalises Iraq’s trade policy; Order 56 gives
the Central Bank of Iraq full independence from the Ministry of finance, thus
depoliticising money and credit; Order 39 grants foreign investors the right to
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equal treatment under the law, rights to purchase business entities (with some
restrictions), and full rights to repatriate profits. Other potential reforms include
the privatisation of Iraq’s public sector enterprises and the development of con-
tractual arrangements that allow private corporations greater dealings in Iraq’s
oil industry.65 The financial cost to enact this transformation in social property
relations has been estimated at somewhere around US$1–2 trillion – a cost that
must eventually be paid by the ‘middling ranks’ of US tax payers.66 It is also a
financial cost that is likely to mount as resistance to the occupation continues.
In Iraq, then, the connections between the deployment of state power, its capi-
talisation and the ongoing nature of primitive accumulation all come together in a
display of attempted constitutional transformation and violent resistance. This
resistance should be understood within a broader historical context of Islamist
and nationalist resistance to the foreign domination of their political economies.67
Indeed, while the insurgency in Iraq consists of a number of groups and organis-
ations (primarily of Sunni origin), and while their tactics, strategies and aims may
ultimately differ, what appears beyond dispute is that the primary point of refer-
ence for their struggles is the US-led military occupation of the country, combined
with an understanding that the right to decide the future of their own political
economy has largely been expropriated by US technocrats and pro-occupation
forces in and outside Iraq’s parliament. As one conference of Iraqi unions
declared: ‘We are united in our opposition to the imposition of privatisation of
the Iraqi economy by the occupation, the IMF, the World Bank foreign powers,
and any force that takes away the right of the Iraqi people to determine their
own economic fate.’68 However, the resistance in Iraq is not simply spawned by
the potential privatisation of Iraq’s public sector. A number of other factors
such as the indiscriminate killing of civilians by occupation forces, the construc-
tion of permanent military bases and a palatial US embassy, the torture and abuse
of Iraqi prisoners, and high unemployment, food insecurity and poverty also con-
tribute to the ongoing resistance. For instance, transformations in the social prop-
erty relations of the country have already compounded the experience of insecurity
for a number of Iraqis:
Price controls have all but disintegrated; petrol station owners
demand a ‘karamiya’ (consideration) on top of the official price
of 20 dinar per litre. Prices of flour, rice and cement have all
tripled or quadrupled, according to interviews with Iraqis. Rents
have shot up, putting families out on the street. Many of Baghdad’s
squatters say they have been evicted by landlords from flats whose
rents were controlled under the former regime.69
Although this is only a cursory overview of some of the contested social property
initiatives now being implemented in Iraq, the point has been to demonstrate the
ongoing nature of primitive accumulation and its connection with the
capitalisation of the US state. The strategic occupation and reconstitution of
Iraq’s political economy is at the same time an act of expropriation, insofar as
it seeks to transform the social property relations of the country and do away
with Iraq’s previous socialist constitution and alternative understandings of
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development. This project, as well as others in Haiti and Afghanistan, would be
impossible without foreign and domestic finance and the belief among creditors
that the US government will be able to extract the necessary taxes from its citizens
to repay the debt with interest.70 However, as the resistance to the US occupation
of Iraq demonstrates, finance and military capability may not be enough to effect
the changes desired by militant liberals.
Conclusion
Joseph Schumpeter once observed that ‘public finances are one of the best starting
points for an investigation of society. The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its
social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – and this and more is written in
its fiscal history.’71 While this paper has only considered some of the recent fiscal
history of the US government in relation to its intervention in Iraq, it demonstrates
some of ‘the deeds its policy may prepare’. One such endeavour has been the
attempt forcibly to alter the social property relations of its occupied territories.
Here, I suggested that Marx’s re-theorisation of the concept of primitive accumu-
lation, combined with a non-Marxist theorisation of state power offered by Nitzan
and Bichler, can help us understand the connection between this developing stra-
tegic project and the ongoing capitalisation of the US government.
Although I am inclined to side with Nitzan and Bichler’s theorisation of capital
as commodified power, the concept of primitive accumulation remains important
to explain the spatial expansion and deepening of market imperatives once we
come to realise that the full instantiation of market imperatives, as Polanyi once
recognised, is incongruous with human survival and thus generates spontaneous
forms of progressive and often reactionary forms of resistance. Such resistance
has produced and can produce social barriers that limit the power of capitalist
firms to shape and reshape the terrain of social reproduction.
Part of explaining this dynamic of power and resistance, rests in a more exten-
sive historical and theoretical understanding of state power and its application as a
commodified entity that largely acts in accordance with the interests of its credi-
tors and dominant capital groups, be they domestic or foreign. Since planners in
the US government have consciously developed the capacity to intervene,
occupy and reconstruct or reconstitute political economies with the express
purpose of introducing the silent compulsions of the market, we would do well
to consider it as one of the most important agents of primitive accumulation
and social transformation. This holds insofar as the politico-military apparatus
of the USA is mobilised to introduce, instantiate and intensify market imperatives
in countries sheltered – even partially – from the full mediation of life by the
market and the firms that dominate it.
There are of course a number of things at stake in this analysis of US sovereign
power and its violent role in primitive accumulation. Chief among them, yet often
overlooked, is the vital role citizens play when paying their taxes to the US gov-
ernment. Though the tradition of refusing to pay taxes for war in the USA dates to
the American Revolution, its practice was perhaps best understood by Henry
David Thoreau in his famous essay on civil disobedience: ‘If a thousand men
were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody
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measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and
shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any
such is possible.’72 There is little doubt that the struggle against war and foreign
domination has had many sites and slogans. But perhaps the most important site is
now currently in the USA where the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating
Committee is waging a battle to redirect taxes away from war under the slogan
‘if you work for peace, stop paying for war’.73 If the 10,000 war tax resisters con-
tinue to grow, then the fiscal history of the USA may indeed tell a very different
story about the ‘spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, [and] the
deeds its policy may prepare’.
Notes
I would like to thank Adrienne Roberts, Robbie Shilliam, Stephen Gill and Jonathan Nitzan for the many con-
versations that have helped shape this paper. The comments and suggestions of three anonymous reviewers
also considerably strengthened the piece. All errors are of course my own.
1. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (Penguin Group, 1976), pp. 931–40.
2. Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of
Primitive Accumulation (Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 324–31.
3. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Oxford University Press,
[1776] 1998), p. 208.
4. Matthew Sparke, ‘American Empire and Globalisation: Postcolonial Speculations on Neocolonial Enfram-
ing’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2003), pp. 376–81.
5. Mark T. Berger, ‘From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation State
System and the Changing Global Order’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5–25. See also,
Adam David Morton, ‘The Failed State of International Relations’, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 3
(2005), pp. 371–9.
6. National Security Strategy of the US, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed 4 October
2006), p. 1.
7. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (Zed Books, 2001), pp. 29–39.
8. For an analysis of British taxation from the Restoration to the early nineteenth century, see Patrick
K. O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660–1815’, The Economic History Review,
Vol. 41, No. 1 (1988), pp. 1–32. On taxation and debt as a mechanism of primitive accumulation in the per-
iphery, see Matthew Forstater, ‘Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa’,
Research in Political Economy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2005), pp. 51–64. Also Karl Polanyi, The Great Transform-
ation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times (Beacon Press, 1975), p. 164.
9. On their power theory of value see sections IV, V and VI in Jonathan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler, ‘New
Imperialism or New Capitalism?’, Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–86.
10. Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Differential Accumulation: Towards a New Political Economy of Capital’, Review of
International Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1998), pp. 169–216, and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Regimes of
Differential Accumulation: Mergers, Stagflation and the Logic of Globalization’, Review of International
Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), pp. 226–74.
11. Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1995), pp. 399–423.
12. Massimo De Angelis, ‘Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous Character of Capital’s Enclosures’,
TheCommoner, No. 2 (2001), pp. 1–22, and Massimo De Angelis, ‘Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capit-
alism and the Continuous Character of Enclosures’,Historical Materialism, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2004), pp. 57–87.
13. Julian Reid, ‘The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: A Critique of the “Return of Imperialism” Thesis in Inter-
national Relations’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2005), pp. 237–52.
14. By sovereign power, I mean the capacity of the federal government and its agencies to shape and reshape the
terrain of social reproduction both at home and abroad through various policies and techniques of govern-
ment. However, in my view, the most important aspect of US sovereign power is force, particularly,
though not exclusively, military force.
Tim Di Muzio
536
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [C
an
ad
ia
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
N
et
w
or
k]
 A
t: 
20
:0
1 
16
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
15. Robbie Shilliam, ‘Hegemony and the Unfashionable Problematic of “Primitive Accumulation”‘, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2004), pp. 59–88; William Sites, ‘Primitive Globalisation?
State and Locale in Neoliberal Global Engagement’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2000), pp. 121–44;
David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford University Press, 2005); David Moore, ‘Neoliberal Globalisa-
tion and the Triple Crisis of “Modernisation” in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and South Africa’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 6 (2001), pp. 909–29; De Angelis, ‘Marx and Primi-
tive Accumulation’; De Angelis, ‘Separating the Doing and the Deed’, Massimo De Angelis, The Beginning
of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital (Pluto Press, 2007); Paul Zarembka, ‘Primitive Accumu-
lation in Marxism, Historical or Trans-Historical Separation from Means of Production’, The Commoner,
March (2002), pp. 1–9; Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body and Primitive Accumu-
lation (Autonomedia, 2004).
16. John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), and Polanyi, The
Great Transformation, p. 38.
17. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (Verso, 2005), pp. 6–7.
18. Zarembka, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Marxism’, p. 6.
19. Jonathan Nitzan & Shimson Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel (Pluto Press, 2002), p. 31. My
discussion of Nitzan and Bichler’s framework primarily derives from this text.
20. We should note here that by production the theorists mean ‘the entire spectrum of human activity’, not simply
factory work.
21. Nitzan & Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel, p. 38.
22. Ibid., p. 10.
23. Ibid., p. 9.
24. Data on market capitalisation derived from charts found at: http://fortboise.org/top100-history.html
(accessed 15 March 2006).
25. Nitzan & Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel, p. 9.
26. On Exxon Mobil lobbying, see http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/lobby00/topind04.asp and http://
www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid¼294 (accessed 4 October 2006). On Exxon Mobil’s lobbying to lift sanc-
tions in Libya, see ‘US business urging Bush to drop Libya sanctions soon’, Reuters, 23 January 2004. On
training Iraqi oil workers, see Justin Blum, ‘Big oil companies train Iraqi workers free global companies offer
services to establish goodwill, win business’, Washington Post, 6 November 2004. On Exxon Mobil’s
funding of institutions that challenge global warming, see Jennifer Lee, ‘Exxon Backs Groups that Question
Global Warming’, New York Times, 28 May 2003. On Exxon Mobil in Aech, see http://www.laborrights.
org/projects/corporate/exxon/index.html (accessed 4 October 2006). On Exxon Mobil and the World
Bank, see Miren Gutierrez, ‘World: Murky Business in Oil’, Inter Press Service, 20 August 2003. On
Exxon Mobil’s exploits in Alaska, see ‘Alaska group files antitrust suit against Exxon Mobil, BP’, Dallas
Business Journal, 20 December 2005. On the Exxon Valdez spill settlement, see Evelyn Nieves, ‘Court over-
turns jury award in ‘89 Exxon Valdez spill’, New York Times, 8 November 2001. On Exxon Mobil and
Cheney’s energy taskforce, see Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, ‘Document says oil chiefs met with Cheney
task force’, Washington Post, 16 November 2005. On Exxon Mobil and Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, see Justin Blum, ‘Exxon Mobil Profit Soars 75%’, Washington Post, 28 October 2005.
27. Harvey, The New Imperialism, pp. 145–52.
28. Nitzan & Bichler, ‘New Imperialism or New Capitalism?, p. 37. Indeed, there appears to be a glaring meth-
odological difference between Nitzan and Bichler’s framework and traditional Marxists. However, in their
work they seem to suggest that using the term ‘primitive accumulation’ necessarily implicates one in
Marx’s theory of accumulation as surplus labour. My own view is that this need not be the case, since the
term ‘primitive accumulation’, as I understand it, only implies transformations in social property relations
whereby the market comes to determine more and more of social life and its chances.
29. Nitzan & Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel, p. 35.
30. Robert Brenner, ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism’, New Left
Review, Vol. 104 (1977), pp 25–92; George Comninel, Rethinking the French Revolution (Verso, 1987);
Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism (Verso, 1999); David McNally, Political Economy and
the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (University of California Press, 1988).
31. Shilliam, ‘Hegemony and the Unfashionable Problematic’, pp. 59–88.
32. De Angelis, ‘Separating the Doing and the Deed’, pp. 57–87, and Henry Bernstein, ‘The Peasantry in Global
Capitalism: Who, Where and Why?’, in Leo Panitch & Colin Leys (eds), Working Classes, Global Realities
(Merlin Press, 2000), pp. 25–51.
The ‘Art’ of Colonisation
537
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [C
an
ad
ia
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
N
et
w
or
k]
 A
t: 
20
:0
1 
16
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
33. De Angelis, ‘Separating the Doing and the Deed’, p. 60.
34. For a discussion of active and passive dimensions of differential accumulation, see Shimshon Bichler &
Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars’, Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (2004), pp. 266–8.
35. Oscar Olivera & Tom Lewis, Cochabamba: Water War in Bolivia (South End Press, 2004), and Susan
Spronk, ‘Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in Bolivia: The “New Working Class”, the
Crisis of Neoliberalism, and Public Services’, paper presented for the workshop ‘The Dynamics of Non-
Traditional Protest Politics’, annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, York University,
Toronto, 3 June 2006.
36. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (Verso, 1994).
37. Doug Henwood, Wall Street: How it Works and For Whom (Verso, 1997), pp. 22–7.
38. Peter Starck, ‘World Military Spending Topped $1 Trillion in 2004’, Reuters, 7 June 2005.
39. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry (Cornell University Press,
2003); US Space Command, Vision for 2020, 1997, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/
index.html (accessed 3 October 2006); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy,
and the End of the Republic (Metropolitan Books, 2004).
40. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The Curve of American Power’, New Left Review, No. 40 (2006), pp. 77–94;
Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Hegemony Unravelling – I’, New Left Review, No. 32 (2005), pp. 23–80.
41. Marx, Capital, p. 916.
42. Marx, Capital, pp. 915, 919.
43. Carolyn Webber & Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (Simon
and Shuster, 1986), p. 252.
44. Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
45. Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558–1714
(Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 44.
46. Webber & Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World, p. 256.
47. Braddick, The Nerves of State, pp. 21–48.
48. Marx, Capital, pp. 915–6.
49. See Bichler & Nitzan, ‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars’, pp. 33–41. My main point of divergence with
the authors here is my consideration of England as the birthplace of capitalist social property relations. In
their writings on the state and debt they tend to speak generally and schematically rather than offer a histori-
cally specific account of the rise of capitalism.
50. Nitzan & Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel, pp. 13–14.
51. Braddick, The Nerves of State, pp. 27–34; Peter G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A
Study in the Development of Public Credit 1688–1756 (St. Martin’s Press, 1967), pp. 65–75.
52. Timothy J. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Cred-
itworthiness (Cornell University Press, 2005); Stephen Gill, ‘The Global Panopticon? The Neo-liberal State,
Economic life and Democratic Surveillance’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995),
pp. 1–49.
53. Phillip McMichael, ‘Food Security and Social Reproduction: Issues and Contradictions’, in Isabella Bakker
& Stephen Gill (eds), Power, Production and Social Reproduction (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 169–88.
54. Here it should be noted that food service corporations have an interest in profit generation, not food pro-
duction. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that corporations will keep food out of the market in order
to ensure sufficient pricing for their profitability. One example is the fact that in most industrialised countries
farmers are paid not to produce. See Susan George, How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World
Hunger (Allanheld Osmun, 1997).
55. Nitzan & Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel, pp. 14–15.
56. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, p. 5.
57. Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections (Harper Perennial, 2002), p. 506.
58. Simon Dalby, ‘Political Space: Autonomy, Liberalism, and Empire’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
Vol. 30, No. 4 (2005), pp. 415–42; Stephen Gill, ‘The Contradictions of US Supremacy’, in Leo Panitch &
Colin Leys (eds), The Empire Reloaded, Socialist Register 2005 (The Merlin Press, 2004), pp. 23–46;
Andrew Harvey, Ian Sullivan & Ralph Groves, ‘A Clash of Systems: An Analytical Framework to Demystify
the Radical Islamist Threat’, Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2005), pp. 72–87; James R. Holmes & Toshi
Yoshihara, ‘China and the Commons: Angell or Mahan?’, World Affairs, Vol. 168, No. 4 (2005),
pp. 172–92; Barry C. Lynn, ‘War, Trade and Utopia’, The National Interest, No. 82 (2005), pp. 31–39;
Tim Di Muzio
538
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [C
an
ad
ia
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
N
et
w
or
k]
 A
t: 
20
:0
1 
16
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, ‘Global Capitalism and American Empire’, in Leo Panitch & Colin Leys (eds),
The New Imperial Challenge, Socialist Register 2004 (The Merlin Press, 2003), pp. 1–38; Michael Wesley,
‘Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2005), pp. 55–73.
59. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, pp. 308, 310.
60. Carl Hulse, ‘Senate approves budget, breaking spending limits’, New York Times, 17 March 2006.
61. ‘Long Ranger: Return of 30 year Treasury Bonds’, The Economist, 4 February 2006, p. 67. Some analysts
believe that increasing the rate of maturity by introducing the bond makes good financial sense since the
costs of long-term borrowing are currently low.
62. While I deal exclusively with Iraq here, accounts of similar processes can be found in Haiti and Afghanistan.
On Haiti, see Steve Lendman, ‘Closing Haiti’s open veins: Rene Preval’s impossible mission’, ZNET, 2006,
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID¼55&ItemID¼9847 (accessed 3 July 2005).
For an overview of recent neoliberal reforms to Afghanistan, see World Bank, The Investment Climate in
Afghanistan: Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, 2005, http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/AF_ICA_Report.pdf (accessed 4 October 2006).
63. David Bacon, ‘Iraqi unions defy privatization’, The Progressive, October 2005, http://www.progressive.
org/?q ¼ mag_bacon1005 (accessed 5 April 2007).
64. The ensuing discussion on Iraq’s provisional constitution draws on the country study of Iraq commissioned
by US Department of the Army and published by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.
The country studies, which previously appeared in book form, are now accessible online. Iraq’s overview can
be accessed at http://countrystudies.us/iraq/ (accessed 25 January 2005).
65. On the oil contracts likely to be implemented in Iraq see, Greg Muttitt, Crude Designs: The Rip-off of Iraq’s
Oil Wealth, PLATFORM, November 2005, http://www.carbonweb.org/documents/crude_designs_large.
pdf (accessed 5 April 2007).
66. Jamie Wilson, ‘Iraq War could cost US over $2 trillion, says Nobel Prise-winning economist’, The Guardian,
7 January 2006.
67. Glenn E. Robinson, ‘The Battle for Iraq: Islamic Insurgencies in Comparative Perspective’, Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2007), pp. 261–73.
68. Bacon, ‘Iraqi Unions Defy Privatization’.
69. Charles Clover & Roula Khalaf, ‘Dislocation, Loss and Tragedy’, Financial Times, 22 October 2003.
70. Floyd Norris, ‘Foreigners May Not Have Liked the War, But They Financed It’, New York Times, 12
September 2003.
71. Cited in O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation’, p. 1.
72. Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, 1849, http://thoreau.eserver.org/civil.html (accessed 15
April 2007).
73. http://www.nwtrcc.org/mtap07/mtap0407.pdf (accessed 15 April 2007).
The ‘Art’ of Colonisation
539
